A look into the team’s ascension to greatness and its heydays
Part 4: Putting the finishing touch on the masterpiece
The signing of Morris and Winfield after the 1991 season was of ample significance. For the longest time, it was inconceivable to envision that elite unrestricted free agents would be willing to sign in Toronto. One reason is because in the eyes of these top-end unrestricted free agents, Toronto is a cold city located in a foreign country with ridiculously high tax rate (at least that was the perception anyway). Another factor was that playing in SkyDome for half of the season (eighty-one regular season home games) meant that there was a higher risk of sustaining hamstring injuries because the field was (and still is today) covered with artificial turf and not natural grass. Also, it was very difficult for the franchise, generally regarded as a small-market club with a modest payroll, to compete with large-market U.S.-based teams like the New York Yankees, the Boston Red Sox, and the Los Angeles Dodgers for elite unrestricted free agents because the latter American-based franchises have such deep pockets that they could offer longer-term contracts and/or higher annual salary which the Blue Jays could not match and/or counter.
With all these hurdles, why did Toronto become the landing site for premium unrestricted free agents such as Morris and Winfield? Simply put, players want to play for a winner (especially those who have had a distinguished playing career but have not hoisted the World Series trophy), and even though the Blue Jays had not yet been to the World Series, the club was seen as a very competitive one that was due for at least a World Series appearance (as was evidenced by the team’s ability to win the American League East Division Title in 1985 and 1989, as well as finishing no more than two games behind the division winner on three occasions: 1987, 1988, and 1990).
A secondary factor is that the owner of the team at the time, Labatt Brewing Company, also sensed that Toronto was genuinely very close to the World Series and decided to become a big spender before the 1992 season (putting winning ahead of everything else, including profit). This means that Gillick now had just as much (if not more) financial resources to not only compete with the big boys but outbid them for one or more premium unrestricted free agents on the open market. The stage was now set for Toronto’s memorable runs in 1992 and 1993.
Major free agent signings such as Morris and Winfield were not the only tricks up Gillick’s sleeves. Another trademark of the future Hall-of-Famer GM which became evident during this period and ironically contradicted his earlier nickname, “Stand Pat,” was his ability to make impactful mid-season trades to bolster his already powerful teams. In 1992, Gillick got former twenty-game-winner David Cone (who served as Toronto’s second starter throughout the postseason) from the New York Mets for infielder Jeff Kent and a player to be named later (Ryan Thompson) on 27 August 1992. Even though he eventually turned out to be an all-star second baseman in his own right with the San Francisco Giants years later, this deal gave the already potent starting rotation additional ammo and was extremely crucial.
Indeed, I attribute this move as one of the major reasons why the 96-66 Blue Jays were finally able to advance past the American League Championship Series and win the first of their back-to-back World Series titles. This is because in the playoffs, most teams would shorten their starting rotation to a three-man rotation (unlike the regular season which is usually a five-man rotation) with the reasoning being that they want to go with their best starters. Typically, this means that even if a team were to get swept by the other one in four straight games, each team would still be able to use their ace twice. If the series were to go the full seven games, then both teams would be able to use their ace three times, and their second and third starters twice. For the most part, the teams’ fourth and fifth starters during the regular season would work out of the bullpen in long-relieve situations when and if needed.
Following this pattern, Toronto used a three-man rotation of Morris, Cone, and Juan Guzman in the American League Championship Series against (ALCS) the Oakland Athletics, which the Blue won in six games. However, Toronto actually had so much depth with its postseason starting rotation that manager Cito Gaston opted to use Key as the starting pitcher for game four in the 1992 World Series against the Atlanta Braves with the three-man rotation of Morris, Cone, and Juan Guzman pitching games one to three, and five to seven. As the old saying goes, you can never have too much pitching!
Of course, Toronto might not have been able to beat Oakland and reach the World Series if it were not for Alomar’s heroics against the Athletics’ excellent closer, Dennis Eckersley, in game four of the ALCS when Alomar hit a two-run homer off Eckersley in the ninth inning to tie the game at six, which the Blue Jays eventually won seven to six in eleven innings. Alomar’s home run could not have been timelier as the win gave Toronto a commanding three-to-one lead over Oakland, a deficit that was too big for the Athletics to overcome. Even Gillick himself acknowledged the historical importance of Alomar’s home run: “I don’t think we’d have ever gone to the World Series in 92 if he didn’t hit that home run.” So while it may be true that “good pitching will always stop good hitting,” it works both ways.
It took sixteen years, but Gillick had finally accomplished what he had set out to do in 1978: bring a World Series title to Toronto. However, his spending spree did not end with the signings of Morris and Winfield and the acquisition of Cone. To find out why, stay tuned for Part 5 of my article.