How J. P. Ricciardi Got Sidetracked From Executing Moneyball in Toronto

When J. P. Ricciardi was hired as the General Manager (GM) of the Toronto Blue Jays, he was given the initial mandate to slash payroll because his predecessor Gord Ash had constructed an eighty-eight million dollar roster that failed to make the postseason. More importantly, Ricciardi was supposed to create “mini-Oaklands” by following the “Moneyball” philosophy of his mentor, Billy Beane, who preaches emphasis on analytics.  This emphasis was supposed to translate into strong drafting and player development as well as locking up young and promising players to club-friendly long-term contracts. Unfortunately, during his eight-year tenure as the captain in charge of the ship from 2001–2009, the apprentice got sidetracked.

Whereas Ricciardi initially collected young players with good upsides (e.g., acquiring Rookie of the Year third baseman Eric Hinske along with starting pitcher Justin Miller from the Oakland Athletics for closer Billy Koch), he went on to hand out numerous long-term contracts that stripped the team of its financial flexibility.  These contracts ranged from extensions given to up-and-coming players who (despite their upsides) had yet to prove they could produce on a consistent basis (e.g., inking both center fielder Vernon Wells and Hinske to five-year deals even though both were still under team control) to overly generous contracts supposedly meant to influence unrestricted free agents (e.g., signing both closer B.J. Ryan and front-of-the rotation starting pitcher A.J. Burnett to five-year deals for forty-seven million dollars and fifty-five million dollars respectively). Ricciardi also went all in by first trading pitchers Dave Bush and Zach Jackson along with outfielder Gabe Gross to the Milwaukee Brewers for sweet swing first baseman Lyle Overbay (and pitching prospect Ty Taubenheim), then following up that deal with shipping mid-rotation starting pitcher Miguel Batista and second baseman Orlando Hudson to the Arizona Diamondbacks for slugging third baseman Troy Glaus (and Sergio Santos). In an attempt to end Toronto’s twelve-year playoff drought, Ricciardi also signed gold-glove catcher Bengie Molina to a one-year contract worth five million dollars with a mutual option for a second year.

With an assembly of such high-end talent, why did the club fail to overtake powerhouses like the New York Yankees and the Boston Red Sox and recapture the American League East title for the first time since 1993, or at least win the wild card? Simply put, some of the moves Ricciardi made were very much the “high-risk, high reward” type, and they backfired. For instance, although Ryan was a highly-sought after and aggressively recruited unrestricted free agent, he was coming off a career year after saving 36 games for the Baltimore Orioles in the preceding season (2005) as a first-time closer. Prior to this breakout season, Ryan had been used predominately as a middle reliever (1999–2003) until he was elevated to the setup role in 2004. In other words, it was a risky gamble to ink Ryan to such a lucrative long-term contract when he had not proven he could be a dominant closer for a sustained period of time. Likewise, even though Burnett was heavily pursued by several teams (mostly because of his ability to throw a fastball with the highest velocity among all starting pitchers in Major League Baseball in both the 2002 and 2005 seasons at an average of 94.9 and 95.6 miles per hour respectively) before agreeing to terms with the Blue Jays, he had never won more than twelve games in a single year over the seven seasons as a Florida Marlin. Beyond this, Burnett missed significant playing time in both the 2003 and 2004 seasons due to a serious injury that required surgery. Essentially, Ricciardi was gambling on Burnett being able to translate his raw talent into wins.

Similarly, despite Ricciardi’s high praise of Overbay’s ability to hit for a high average with gap power (he held the Brewers’ club record for most doubles in a single season with fifty-three), Overbay only batted over .300 once in three previous seasons prior to being traded to Toronto, hitting .276, .301 and .276 in 2003, 2004, and 2005, respectively. While a batting average in the mid .270s is not bad, it is by all accounts quite pedestrian and certainly nowhere near elite, especially knowing that Overbay had never hit more than nineteen home runs in a single season at that point in his career even though he plays a traditional power position as a first baseman. The fact that Ricciardi dealt for a player who ended up being a career .266 hitter indicated that the Blue Jays GM was gambling on Overbay being able to become the next Mark Grace when the former was more suited to a reserve role as a defensive replacement.

Finally, Ricciardi’s decision to sign both Wells and right fielder Alex Rios to seven-year contract extensions for $126 million and $69,835,000 respectively did not pan out as both players lacked consistency and failed to perform to expectations. In fact, Wells regressed to such a degree, both offensively and defensively, that he was widely considered to be “untradeable” at the time because his contract was heavily back-loaded. As for Rios, he became so inconsistent that he was eventually placed on waivers on 7 August 2009 before being claimed by the Chicago White Sox three days later. In losing Rios to an opposing team and receiving no assets in return (with the only consolation being that Rios’s contact is now off the Blue Jays’ books), Ricciardi’s shortsightedness is clearly exposed.

All in all, Toronto never really came close to winning the American League East title under Ricciardi. The team’s best season came in 2006 (the season immediately after all of the aforementioned moves were made) when the club won eighty-seven games. However, the win total is misleading as an indicator of the franchise’s competitiveness, as Toronto finished a distanced ten games behind the division winner the Yankees. In essence, with newly injected funds to work with from Rogers, Ricciardi succumbed to the temptation of trying to buy a championship with free agent acquisitions and short-term trades. In doing so, he failed to execute the “Moneyball” game plan and bring a championship back to Toronto.